Mediated Meaning:
A Contextualist Approach to
Hermeneutical Method
JERRYH. GILL
Traditionally defined as "the science of interpretation ,"
hermeneutics has of late evolved into a full-fledged philosophical
concern of its own. Flowing out of the two opposing branches of
the early twentieth century's " search for meaning" (analytic and
existentialist philosophy), hermeneutics stands today as the central
intersection of dialogue within and among such diverse disciplines
as philosophy, linguistics, the arts, political theory, psychology and
theology. The issues and points of view are many and diverse.'
My purpose here is to sketch, in broad strokes, the main contours
of the landscape and to provide a suggested perspective or
"inscape" of my own .
The modern era of hermeneutical understanding was ushered
in with the introduction of the historical-critical method of
textual interpretation.2
In a much needed and eventually
successful attempt to counteract the tyrannical dominance of
authoritarian and/ or spiritualizing hermeneutical activity, modern
scholarship turned to objective, scientific criteria and procedures
for determining what a given text meant . I stress the past tense of
the term "meant" advisedly, for the emphasis of the historicalcritical approach has consistently been on ascertaining what the
text meant for the writer and those to whom it was originally
addressed. By means of historical and textual research , including
and especially archeological investigation, modern interpreters
have sought to bridge the gap between the time of the text and
their own, thereby facilitating a contemporary understanding of
the text's meaning. Norman Perrin offers a fair account of this
historical-critical method in the following passage:
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In the case of texts from another time and another culture
this can be an extremely complex and difficult task ,
involving many different considerations, but the theoretical
principles involved are both firmly established and well
understood. We need, further, to understand as far as we
can the intent of the author in writing the text, and the
meaning understood by those for whom the text was
written. For all of this we need a number of different
critical skills, and ultimately a measure of historical
imagination, as we seek to understand the text as the
author intended it to be understood, or as it was
understood by those who first read it.3
Over against what they perceived as the dehumanizing effects
of the "cult of objectivity" existentialist thinkers arose, ad vocating
a more personal, subjective approach to hermeneutics. 4 Not only
is there no way to know the original meaning of a given text ,
since, as Kierkegaard demonstrated, "significant" meaning always
transcends mere probability and observation, there is no need to
know it, since what really matters for us is what the text means
for today, here and now. In spite of their antipathy for each
other, those advocating the historical-critical method and those
touting the existentialist posture are agreed that there is a meaning
to be found in the text, a message or lesson which can be
discerned, either after appropriate scientific investigation , in the
former case, or after proper demythologization, in the latter case.
Bultmann is as clear as he is adamant that the meaning of
biblical texts, for instance, must and can lie only in the fresh
"self-understanding" which it brings to each of us. As he puts it:
The real purpose of myth is not to present an objecti ve
picture of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth
should be
interpreted
not cosmologically,
but
anthropologically, or better still, existentially. Myth speaks
of the power or the powers which man supposes he
experiences as the ground and limit of his world and of his
own activity and suffering. He describes these powers in
terms derived from the visible world, with its tangible
objects and forces, and from human life, with its feelings,
motives, and potentialities ... Hence the importance of the
New Testament mythology lies not in his imagery, but in
the understanding of existence which it enshrines.5
Following along in the subjectivist mode, and drawin g as well
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on the advice of the "new critics" to avoid the fallacy of assuming
anyone can determine the writer's original intentions, the robust
deconstructionists burst on the scene.6 This hermeneutical posture
or non- posture maintains that the meaning of any text is what we
make it, because not only are we unable to reconstruct its original
meaning , either for the author or the readers, but language itself
is incorrigibly vague, ambiguous and contradictory. The meaning
of a text can never be ascertained and / or interpreted, either for
those then or for us now, for the simple reason that language will
not stand still long enough to allow a single meaning--and this
fact ought to be celebrated, rather than lame nted! Any given
statement can be given a number of meanings, sometimes even the
opposite of what it appears to mean, as ironic utterances clearly
illustrate.
One of the more enthusiastic proponents of the
application of this methodology to the theological enterprise is
Mark Taylor. In personal conversation he said to me that it is
"the most important thing to happe n to theology in the latter half
of the twentieth century."
It is significant to note that the decons tructionist
hermeneutical posture, while sharing the subjectivist emphasis of
the existentialist approach, differs both from it and from the
objectivism of the historical-critical perspecti ve by insisting that
meaning is never direct, but is, rathe r, entirely a function of the
hearer's interpretive response.
In other words, according to
deconstructionist thinkers, the focus of meaning has shifted from
the author, to the text itself, and finally to the reade r alone . In
s hort, the activity of interpretation, as well as the meaning of a
given text, has now become so indirect, the focus has become so
"soft," as to be essentially nonexistent. Meaning is in the mind of
the reader or hearer, period.
It is, of course, impossible to de ny both the strengths and
weaknesses of each of these hermeneutical postures. The trick is
to devise some way of integrating the former and avoiding the
latter without ending up with a lumpy eclecticism. Is there a way
to maintain the objectivity and authority of the text, together with
contemporary and personal relevance, and yet acknowledge the
indirect , open- texture of language? By itself the histo rical-critical
method is limited , both in results and scope of application.
Existentialist hermeneutics tends to be not only a-historical but
anti-historical and social. Deconstructionism makes a valuable
point, but becomes pointless--and indeed, meaningless--when
applied to itself. So, one must ask, in Peggy Lee's words, "Is that
all there is?"
My own suggestion at this juncture is to urge the development
of a contextua/ist approach to hermeneutics, one which
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incorporates the emphases and concerns at each of the above
postures. More specifically, a contextualist hermeneutic seeks an
understanding of a text in which meaning is mediated in and
through the historical, existential and linguistic dimensions of
human experience simultaneously. There simply is no need to
choose any of these aspects of our common life as the primary
mode, or to assume that they are mutually exclusive . For, clearly,
our day-to-day existence does not come compartmentalized in
such a manner. The following diagram indicates the relationship
amongst these various emphases and methodologies:
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As I see it, contextualist hermeneutic is comprised of at least
three main themes, each of which deserves a brief explication.
The following remarks constitute my own "inscape" (with thanks
to Gerard Manley Hopkins) into the hermeneutical thicket
sketched above.
II
First, a contextualized perspective acknowledges the deeply
social and relational character of language and speech. People
speak, not only in order to be understood, but because they are
understood. It is language which mediates social reality to us,
both initially and continuously, and which brings us into the
human community, both as members and as selves . Thus the
hermeneutical task is surely grounded in a basic knowledge of
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what a given text meant in its original human context, both
historically and linguistically. This historical-critical concern is
complemented, rather than set aside, by an equally sincere concern
for the meaning of a text in the contemporary setting. Moreover,
neither of these dimensions is obviated by a sensitivity to the
flexible, open-textured quality of language, a quality which is
necessitated by the ever-evolving social tasks in which language is
employed.
One thinker who has contributed a great deal to this
contextualist perspective is the social psychologist George Herbert
Mead .7 Mead stressed the social character of the human self, and
the crucial role played by language in the composition of both
culture and personhood. He termed the process by means of
which both are constituted, " symbolic interaction," and he argued
cogently for the "thick" understanding of the integral relationship
between language and reality which comprises the fabric of human
existence. Language is more than a mere system of signs for
designating parts and aspects of the world . It is, rather, an
organic form of human behavior that creates and shapes our world
as well as describing it. Here is how he states it:
The central factor in such adjustment is "meaning."
Meaning arises and lies within the field of the relation
between the gesture of a given human organism and the
subsequent behavior of this organism as indicated to
another human organism by that gesture. If that gesture
does so indicate to another organism the subsequent (or
resultant) behavior of the given organism, then it has
meaning . In other words, the relationship between a given
stimulus--as a gesture--and the later phases of the social
act for which it is an early (if not the initial) phase
constitutes the field within which meaning originates and
exists.
Meaning is thus a development of something
objectively there as a relation between certain phases of
the social act; it is not a psychical addition to that act and
it is not an "idea" as traditionally conceived .... The social
process, as involving communication, is in a sense
responsible for the appearance of new objects in the field
of experience of the individual organisms implicated in
that process. Organic processes or responses in a sense
constitute the objects to which they are responses; that is
to say, any given biological organism is in a way
responsible for the existence (the meanings they have for
it) of the objects to which it physiologically and chemically
responds. There would, for example, be no food--no

32

Gill

edible objects--if there were no organisms which could
digest it. And similarly, the social process in a sense
constitutes the objects to which it responds or to which it
is an adjustment. That is to say, objects are constituted in
terms of meanings within the social process of experience
and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one
another of the responses or actions of the various
individual organisms involved in that process, an
adjustment made possible by means of a communication
which takes the form of a conversation gestures in the
earlier evolutionary stages of that process and of language
in its later stages. s
Another contributor to the contextualist approach is the
mature Ludwig Wittgenstein.9 He emphasized the social and acti ve
dimension of speech by likening it to the various "games people
play ." He did not intend thereby to trivialize or demean linguistic
interchange. Rather, he sought to highlight its pragmatic nature,
that it is grounded in our shared tasks and purposes, and thus that
it is a way we do things in and with our common world.
Wittgenstein likened speech to a toolbox, to chess and to the
exchange of money in order to suggest that meaning is, at the
deepest level, a function of use in context. After all , apart from
some concrete use in a particular setting by and to a specific
person(s), a given string of sounds and/ or markings cannot be said
to have any meaning at all. The following is a representati ve
Wittgenstienian insight:
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and yo u
think of the meaning as a thing of the same kind as the
word , though also different from the word. Here the
word, there the meaning. The money, and the cow that
you can buy with it.
(But contrast: money, and its
use .) ... A main source of our failure to understand is that
we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.
Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A
perspicuous representation produces just that understanding
which consists in "seeing connexions" .... 10
Hans-George Gadameru has also contributed to a contextualist
understanding of hermeneutics by means of his explorations in the
phenomenology of language.
Like Wittengenstein , Gadamer
focuses on the participatory and interactionary aspects of linguistic
communication, particularly through the notions of "pla y" and
"conversation." These notions underline both the creati ve and
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dialogical character of speech, indeed, even to the point of
stressing the significance of silence in an overall understanding of
meaning. For Gadamer, language is organic; it grows and dies. In
addition, language is neither optional nor arbitrary; all humans
participate in it to some degree and, at the primordial level, it
arises in the warp and weft of concrete daily existence. As he
says:
Language is by no means simply an instrument, a tool.
For it is in the nature of the tool that we master its use,
which is to say we take it in hand and lay it aside when it
has done its service . That is not the same as when we take
the words of a language, lying ready in the mouth, and
with their use let them sink back into the general store of
words over which we dispose. Such an analogy is false
because we never find ourselves as consciousness over
against the world and , as it were grasp after a tool of
understanding in a wordless condition. Rather, in all our
knowledge of ourselves and in all knowledge of the world,
we are always already encompassed by the language that is
our own. We grow up, and we become acquainted with
men and in the last analysis with ourselves when we learn
to speak. Learning to speak does not mean learning to use
a preexistent tool for designating a world already somehow
familiar to us; it means acquiring a familiarity and
acquaintance with the world itself and how it confronts
us.12
III
A second motif of a contextualist hermeneutic is an insistence
on the active and pragmatic character of linguistic communication.
Here again, the later Wittgenstein's work has proven to be most
helpful, for it gave rise to the insights of the Oxford philosopher ,
J. L. Austin.n Austin began by noting that frequently we do
more than merely speak when we use language, we sometimes
accomplish deeds as well.
When, for example, we say "I
apologize," or "I pronounce you husband and wife" in the
appropriate circumstances, etc., we are performing the act of
apologizing and pronouncing.
Austin dubbed such utterances
"performatives," and he suggested that as an important form of
speech they break down the traditional dichotomies between
language and reality, and between factual judgments and value
judgments.
In his later work, Austin suggested that every
"speech-act" consists of at least three dimensions of meaning,
each of which is essential to its overall significance.
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Take, for example, the sign which used to hang in British
railwa y lavatories: "Gentlemen Lift the Seat." One might well ask
whether this is a stipulative definition, an empirical description,
an imperative or an invitation to upperclass larceny. Everything
depends on context and use, and in spite of the fact that it is both
enlightening and entertaining to play around with possible
meanings, it is roughly clear what this sign means. However,
Austin would surely suggest that there is a "referential" dimension
to the utterance (there must be gentlemen and a seat, for instance) ,
as well as an "intentional" dimension (what the sign-makers
intended) and a "responsive" dimension (some signs are so
constructed as to give rise to unintended responses). All of these
aspects of meaning must be taken into consideration when
interpreting the sign.
It is this pragmatic thrust of language which counteracts the
unbridled relativism of deconstructionism.
For, although any
given statement is subject to a wide variety of readings , in the
vast majority of cases the context either provides sufficient
guidance by which to ascertain the meaning, or sufficient
feedback by which to determine what went wrong in the case of
misunderstanding. To acknowledge the possibility of multiple
meanings and misunderstandings is a far cry from affirming that
concrete interpretation is impossible. As Wittgenstein put it: " If I
say 'The ground was quite covered with plants,' do you want to
say that you don't know what I mean until I give you a definition
of a 'plant'?" Of course, many readings are possible, even here ,
but that does not mean that some are not better than others. 14
Another thinker, once again a phenomenologist, who f eeds
into the pragmatist current of a contextualist approach to
hermeneutics is Maurice Merleau-Ponty.15
His work on the
pivotal role of human embodiment in the composition of our
particular form of !ife, especially as it involves the use of speech
as a form of bodily behavior, is of front-rank significance .
Merleau-Ponty suggests that through embodiment and language we
interact with and shape our world, both physical and social. In
short, he contends that our world is in large measure linguistically
constituted by means of our interaction with each other in our
common environment for specific shared tasks. We can neither
separate our "inner" selves from our interactional relationships
with the world, nor can we grasp reality and/ or its meaning
directly, apart from these relationships. However, reflection can
"set back ... to watch the forms of transcendence fly up like sparks
from a fire; it slackens the intentional threads which attach us to
the world and thus brings them to notice."16
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IV
Third, a contextualist stance toward hermeneutical activity
recognizes that, at the primordial level, language and meaning are
fundamentally m etaphoric in nature. The work of Owen Barfield
is highly significant here.17
He calls attention to a deep
contradiction which underlies our modern view of language. On
the one hand , we are generally committed to the idea that people
in ancient and classical (not to say "primitive") times imbibed
myth and metaphor, while we in modern times have " put away
such childish things" in favor of more precise, scientific speech.
On the other hand, we are equally committed to a theory of
language which entails that it begins with specific, literal
meanings and only later are metaphoric and symbolic meanings
derived. But both cannot be true. It cannot be the case that
metaphors build on literal meanings and that the vast majority of
literal terms are in fact "dead" metaphors!
Barfie ld argues that at its inception, whether with respect to
the species or the individual, language must be endemically poetic
in the sense that it does not stand over against or represent reality,
but rather functions symbiotically with it in the mutual
composition of our experienced and known world. Primordial
speech unites thought and reality, analytic speech divides them.
Both, of course, are necessary to human life, but it is clear that
the unity must exist, as a Gestalt, be/ore analysis can take place.
Thus both the historical-critical method and deconstructionism
must acknowledge a more fundamental level of meaning that
provides the context or the foothold for their own activity to have
meaning. We can only analyze, we can only deconstruct, what we
have understood as meaningful in the first place.
One of the most controversial books in philosophical circles in
recent years has been Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. is Kuhn's insights into the development of scientific
thought lend support to the case for a contextualist hermeneutic.
In brief, he contends that in order for any scientific activity to be
carried out there must exist some theoretic framework, some
unarticulated assumptions, forming what Kuhn calls the dominant
paradigm, according to which this activity, including the theoretic
level, gets its direction and meaning. He also maintains that at
certain crucial junctures in the histor y of science, these paradigms
shift, causing a revolution in the way scientists think and work.
The Copernican and Einsteinian revolutions are examples of such
shifts in paradigms.
What is pivotal for our topic is the idea, espoused by an
increasing number of scientific thinkers, that all meaningful
activity and thought must take place within some social and
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linguistic context. Contrary to the warnings of some, this does not
mean that all truth and meaning are relative in the subjectivist,
skeptical sense. Rather, it simply means that serious attention
must be paid to the shape and direction, to the concrete
particulars, of the context within which linguistic meaning arises
when one engages in the task of interpretation. From the fact that
no meaning is contextless it does not follow that meaningful
communication is impossible.
There are many points of connection between the notion of
paradigm and that of metaphor in the primordial sense. It is
within what Stephen Pepper called our "root metaphors" l9 that we
live and move and have our being, at both the practical and
theoretic levels of our common human existence. One could argue
that the history of any culture, especially in relation to
intercultural encounter and dialogue, exhibits shifts in root
metaphors, or mythologies, parallel to the paradigm s hifts in
scientific thought. It is essential that hermeneutical activity be
sensitive to and make constructive use of the differences and
developments within and among various historical and cultural
contexts. 20
One other important thinker whose work supports a
metaphorical understanding of the contextualist approach to
hermeneutics is the Harvard philosopher, Nelson Goodman. In his
delightfully deep little book, Ways of World making , 21 Goodman
invites us to think of the various worlds we inhabit, such as the
worlds of science, economics, art, religion, morality, etc. , as the
result of our collaborative, creative interaction with our
multidimensional environment. They grow out of each other,
overlap with each other, and at times conflict with each other.
These worlds are not fabricated arbitrarily, but arise as we engage
in various shared activities and purposes.
Nevertheless, they
develop organically out of basic alternative ways of
conceptualizing reality. This sort of open-mindedness entails, to
be sure, a kind of relativism, but Goodman insists that this does
not mean "anything goes." He advocates a "relativism with rigor"
in order to distinguish truly helpful root metaphors fro m wildeyed word salad. In his own words:
What I have said so far plainly points to a radical
relativism; but severe restraints are imposed. Willingness
to accept countless alternative true or right world-versions
does not mean that everything goes, that tall stories are as
good as short ones, that truths are no longer distinguished
from falsehoods, but only that truths must be otherwise
conceived than as correspondence with a ready- made
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world . Though we make worlds by making versions, we
no more make a world by putting symbols together at
random than a carpenter makes a chair by putting pieces
of wood together at random.
The multiple worlds I
countenance are just the actual worlds made by and
answering to true or right versions. Worlds possible or
impossible supposedly answering to false versions have no
place in my philosophy.22

v
What, then, are the potential dividends for religious life and
understanding of this contextualist hermeneutical stance? Clearly
such an approach entails a mediational view of revelation. By this
I mean a view which sees God's activity in the world as mediated
in and through historical, social and natural processes and events.
For the Christian faith the notion of incarnation focuses this
understanding of revelation in an axial fashion.
"The Word
became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld the glory,. .. full
of grace and truth." The emphasis here is on discerned glory
amidst the significant dimensions of life , not on supernatural
intrusions from outer space. Even and especially in Christ we see
through a glass, darkly. I say "especially" because it is only by
means of a mediated mode of revelation that God can embody and
communicate honest love and respect for human decision and
responsibility, as John Hick has so profoundly made clear.23
A contextualist hermeneutic will come at the S criptures in a
similar manner. As a most important mediator of the nature and
meaning of divine revelation, the texts of the Bible must be
interpreted in terms of every relevant dimension: historically,
literarily, culturally, existentially and imaginatively. What the y
meant originally, as best as can be determined , what they have
meant through the centuries, what they mean to us now, and what
they may mean to readers now and in the future--all these
contexts mediate significant meaning, even for one another. The
focus should be on the various root metaphors in each context and
on how they function for the people therein, always with an eye
to what they may yet reveal in our own and other settings. The
Scripture is a record and interpretation of the community of
believers' interaction with what they discern as God's activity in
their midst. Two examples come readily to mind. Martin Luther
King's interpretation of Israel's approach to the "Promised Land"
in relation to the cause of Black people in America and the Civil
Rights Movement was more than mere application, while being
less specific than simple allegory. It constitutes an exemplary case
of contextualist methodology. In a similar vein, the Reformist
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dimension of the Christian Feminist Movement constitutes, in my
view, a sound contextualist interpretation of Paul's powerful, if
belatedly understood , remark that "In Christ there is ... no male or
female" (Galatians 3:28). The true meaning of this remark has
only begun to dawn on the Christian Church.
The symbolism and ritual of worship will also be seen in a
different light as a result of a contextualist hermeneutic.
Participation in traditional and / or contemporary worship need not
be viewed as merely that, but can be appreciated as a mediational
means of participating in a multidimensional reality, wherein
significance and value arise through active commitment to and
involvement with the people and events of one's context.
Baptism, the saying of the creeds, and the Eucharist, for example,
are activities we engage in as a community, by means of which we
accomplish or perform certain tasks or acts, and which function
as the primordial metaphors for expressing the discernments and
commitments that lie at the center of our common faith and life.
This is not to say, of course, that symbols and rituals never
become obsolete or that fresh ones can never be created. It is
only to say that such alterations should be effected slowly and
broadly, and that when they occur they will do so as a result of
contours of communal needs, values and goals. Although it has
come as a shock to many Roman Catholics, the reform instituted
by the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s with respect to
the liturgy of the Mass strikes me as an excellent example of a
It seeks a
contextualist interpretation of the worship ritual.
middle ground between past significance and contemporary life,
without self-destructing into sheer subjectivism. Moreover, such
reform establishes connections with other dimensions of the
Christian community, thereby contributing to the unit y of the
Church. Catholic and Protestant dialogue, as well as common
worship and social action, are no longer simply a dream .
Finally, theology itself must also be affected by a contextualist
hermeneutic. The traditional model of theology as a metaph ysical
counterpart to Newtonian science is clearly no longer viable. This
includes all pontifical theologies, of both the philosophical and
dogmatic varieties, left and right. Moreover, the individualized
theologies of the existentialist and deconstructionist brands are of
little help over the long and broad pull. The theologies most
attentive to the contextualist motif would appear to be those being
forged in the socio-political arena on the one hand and those
working the "New Hermeneutic" field on the other hand. The
former must be careful to allow for the distinction betwee n the
mediating context and that which is being mediated, lest the truth
of revelation be equated with the expedient. The latter must pay
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increasing attention to developing the logic of language and story
in a truly metaphoric mode, otherwise we shall once again be
faced with a no-win choice between objectivism and subjectivism.
To my mind, the theologian who is doing the most creative, yet
substantive work in this mode is Sallie McFague.24 Drawing on
the insights of the likes of Robert Funk and Dan Via, as well as
insights of many of the thinkers already mentioned above,
McFague explores the ramifications of approaching theology as an
activity more akin to aesthetic criticism than to science or
philosophy. Focusing on the role of parable as central both to
Jesus's life and work and to the ongoing life of the Church, she
stresses the "story" character of truth in general, as well as the
metaphoric and mediational nature of revelation in particular. In
McFague's words:
The parables of the New Testament are united by a
number of characteristics, of which one of the most
outstanding is their concern with relationships of various
kinds. What is important in the parables is not who the
characters are (a static notion) but what they do (a
dynamic one). The plot is always the heart of a parable,
what a character or several characters decide in matters
having to do with their relationships with each other.
Whether one thinks of the parable of the Prodigal Son , the
Good Samaritan, the Unjust Steward, or the Great Supper,
it is relationships and decisions about them that are
Just as the central Old Testament religious
critical.
language is relational--focused on the covenant between
God and persons and their way of being in the world in
community--likewise, if we look at Jesus as a parable of
God, we have no alternative but to recognize personal,
relational language as the most appropriate language about
God. Whatever more one may wish to say about him, he
was a person relating to other persons in loving service and
transforming power.25
The cardinal concern for a contextual, mediational
understanding of hermeneutics, in addition to its emphasis on
those factors adumbrated in the foregoing pages, is the
acknowledgement that whatever truth we possess, we carry in
"earthen vessels."
No truth can be revealed apart from the
particulars of a concrete context, but no particular context can be
equated with revealed truth. Mediated meaning must be shared
both confidently and with humility, a rare and difficult
combination, but a necessary one.
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VI
Permit me a brief "concluding unprofessional postscript."
have no idea how my initial mentor, Professor Traina, will react
to the foregoing reflections. On the one hand, my concern to
allow the scripture to "speak for itself," liberated from the
tyranny of traditional and/ or parochial agendae, is certainly
traceable to his tireless and insightful efforts in the courses I took
with him thirty years ago. On the other hand, he may complain
that I have collapsed the distinction between interpretation,
application and correlation. To this I can only answer that this
distinction must be called into question, not in order to do away
with it altogether, but in order to do justice to the manner and
degree to which we are embodied and embedded in the language
and thought patterns of our own heritage, both traditional and
contemporary .
Although there is no way we can extricate
ourselves from these webs of meaning in order to be eyeball-toeyeball with truth and/ or reality, we can, by acknowledging both
the limitations and the functional adequacy of our own knowledge
claims, be confident without being arrogant in our hermeneutica l
It is this circumspect confidence at which a
endeavors.
contextualist hermeneutic aims--and that toward which Robert
Traina pointed his students by means of his own example.
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